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Abstract 
Using panel data collected in 2015 and 2018, this paper employs econometric techniques to 
evaluate the impact of migration on the welfare of households left behind in rural Ghana. We 
find that poverty is an important driver of migration. Households with lower baseline food and 
nonfood consumption are more likely to have a member migrating over the three-year period of 
the study. Specifically, households with migrants had a lower level of consumption at baseline 
compared to non-migrant households. Using both propensity score matching (PSM) and 
difference-in-differences (DID) estimation approaches to explore migration’s welfare impact, we 
find no significant differences between treated and control households once initial baseline 
differences in consumption are accounted for. Our results suggest that migration has helped to 
bridge the gap in welfare between disadvantaged (low consumption) and advantaged (higher 
consumption) households in rural Ghana.  
 
Keywords: Internal migration; household welfare; rural inequality; subjective wellbeing; Ghana 
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Executive Summary 
The welfare impact of migration, especially for developing countries, has been the focus of much 
debate in both policy and academic circles. In some developing countries such as Ghana, public 
discussions on migration have historically endorsed the view that the phenomenon is often 
unnecessary and detrimental to national development. The discussions have, however, usually 
been carried out without much quantitative evidence. 
This study employs standard quantitative techniques to evaluate, for rural Ghana, the impact of 
migration on the welfare of migrants’ rural households of origin. The study used panel data 
collected from two rounds (2015 and 2018) of the Migrating out of Poverty household survey. 
The methodology used in the study mainly consisted of the propensity score matching (PSM) and 
the difference-in-differences (DID) quantitative techniques. It should be noted, however, that 
descriptive statistics were also employed to gain insight into the drivers of migration. For the 
objective measure of welfare, we used household consumption expenditure per person, taking 
into account gender and age differences among household members. On the other hand, the 
subjective measure of welfare employed is households’ subjective self-assessment of changes in 
their financial situation.  
 
For both the propensity score matching (PSM) and the difference-in-differences (DID) 
approaches, no significant welfare differences were found between migrant-sending and non-
migrant-sending households, once initial baseline differences in consumption are accounted for. 
These results show that while there could be potential benefits of migration, three years may be 
too short a period to observe migration’s welfare impact. It is also a reflection of the time it takes 
for migrants to adjust at their destination to be able to substantially support their former 
households. We find similar results for the analysis of migration’s impact on subjective welfare. 
The study also finds some notable descriptive results. First, there is a high incidence of internal 
migration from households in rural Ghana. About 37% of the 2015 households that had not sent-
out a migrant had become a migrant-sending household by 2018, whereas only 2% had sent out 
international migrants by 2018. We find that poverty seems to be an important driver of 
migration in rural Ghana. Households with lower baseline food and nonfood consumption seem 
to be more likely to have a member migrating over the three-year period of the study than 
households with higher baseline food and non-food consumption.  
In examining transition (improvement or otherwise) in households’ subjective financial situation, 
we find significant gains for migrant households that originally in 2015 had a deteriorated 
financial situation. On the contrary, the majority of the non-migrant households that had a 
deteriorated financial situation in 2015 did not perceive a significant improvement in their 
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financial situation in 2018. Thus, in terms of financial situation migrant-sending households that 
had ‘deteriorated financial situations’ seem to be the biggest gainers of migration. A similar 
analysis for consumer welfare, however, did not yield similar results. This is a caution that an 
analysis of consumption welfare can produce results that appear to contradict that of subjective 
welfare. 
Based on the findings of this study, we conclude that internal migration may not have a short-
term beneficial impact on the welfare of migrants’ former household members. There is, 
however, the potential for migration to exert a long-term favourable impact on the welfare of 
rural households left behind.  
It is also important for policymakers to put in place policies and structures to help rural 
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Introduction 
Although migration is not a new phenomenon, its effects on the socio-economic development of 
migrant sending areas and welfare of household members left behind has been the focus of much 
debate in both policy and academic circles (Ratha, 2007; de Haas, 2010; Serbeh et al. 2016). While 
migration optimists assume that migration and associated remittances contribute to socio-
economic development and improved welfare in migrant-sending areas (Andrews et al. 2008), 
migration pessimists argue that migration  rather contributes to underdevelopment and poverty 
in sending areas (de Haan and Yaqub, 2009).  
 
In developing countries, in particular, the discourse on migration and remittances has gained 
heightened interest, in view of the numerous studies that aimed at identifying their effects on 
various welfare outcomes (Quartey, 2006; Fajnzylber and Lopez 2007, Anyanwu and Erhijakpor 
2010, Mendola, 2012). While there is a general perception that remittances have beneficial 
welfare effects  (Ratha, 2007 Mohapatra et al. 2009), some researchers have pointed out that 
out-migration can sometimes negatively affect welfare in some migrant sending communities 
(Cuong et al. 2009). In some developing countries such as Ghana, public discussions on migration 
have historically endorsed the view that migration is often unnecessary and detrimental to 
national development.  Consequently, many policy initiatives tend to discourage people from 
moving from rural areas to urban areas in particular (Awumbila et al, 2014). Yet there is lack of 
data on the actual welfare impacts of migration from rural Ghana, in particular.   
 
The aim of this paper is to examine the the impact of migration on the welfare of the migrants’ 
former households, that is, the households left behind. Thus, while migration’s welfare impact 
can be viewed from three main perspectives, namely, the impact on the migrant, the impact on 
the place of origin, and the impact on the place of destination, our focus in this paper is the 
welfare impact on the place of origin. We seek to answer the following questions: (a) What is the 
impact of migration on the welfare (proxied by consumption expenditure) of migrants’ former 
households? (b) What is the impact of migration on the wellbeing (proxied by households’ 
subjective assessments of financial position) of migrants’ former households? and (c) Does 
migration’s welfare impact on left-behind households differ across different types of 
households? 
 
This type of investigation is important for a couple of reasons. First, from a developing country 
perspective, it is believed that apart from the anticipated personal gain from migrating, many 
migrants are motivated to migrate because of the expected welfare benefit for their left-behind 
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households (Stark 1991). The second point – related to the first – is the significance of such a 
focus for the New Economics of Labour Migration (NELM) hypothesis that migration is usually a 
collective decision by the prospective migrant’s household (or family) (Stark 1991; de Haas, 
2010).  
 
In the next section, we highlight some of the main issues discussed in the literature on migration’s 
welfare impact, noting conceptual and methodological challenges. The third section provides a 
description of the methodology and the data employed. In the fourth section, we present and 
discuss the estimated results relating to migration’s welfare impact on households left behind. 
Section five concludes the paper with a summary and policy recommendations. 
 
Insights from relevant literature 
This section provides an overview of both the theoretical perspectives and empirical literature 
on welfare impacts of migration and remittances.  
 
The effects of Migration on Welfare and Poverty Reduction 
The effects of labour migration on welfare and by implication poverty reduction in migrant 
sending communities has been a source of debate in the migration literature.  In the 1960s and 
1970s, two opposing schools of thought, namely migration optimists and pessimists, dominated 
this debate (de Haas 2010).  Drawing insights from neo-classical migration economic and 
developmentalist modernisation theories, migration optimists argue that migration contributes 
positively to poverty reduction and improved welfare. The neo-classical migration scholars argue 
that individuals usually take the decision to migrate if the expected gains outweigh the risks 
associated with migration (Andrews et al. 2008).  The neo-classical theorists further argued that 
labour migration from a region with low wages and surplus labour supply to a region with high 
wages and high demand for labour is a form of optimal allocation of productive factors in both 
the migrant’s places of origin and destination (de Haas 2010). The reallocation of labour from 
poor labour surplus regions to more developed regions is seen as a major component of the 
development process. Neo-classical migration scholars argue further that labour mobility ceases 
at the later stages of development when wages at the sending and receiving areas converge. 
Given that the neo-classical optimists focus on individual migration decision-making rather than 
household migration decision processes, they did not emphasise the role of remittances in 
contributing to socio-economic development and poverty reduction in migrant sending areas. 
The migration optimists, on the other hand, emphasise the role of migrant remittances in the 
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economic development and poverty reduction process at migrants’ places of origin (see Serbeh 
et al. 2016).  
The migration optimists’ assumption that population mobility contributes to socio-economic 
development and welfare in migrant-sending areas was contested by the migration pessimists 
who have drawn on structuralist social and dependency theories to argue that migration  rather 
contributes to underdevelopment and poverty in sending areas through brain drain (Baldwin 
1970; de Haan and Yaqub 2009). Thus, while the optimists see migration as good for 
development, the pessimists suggest that poor regions (especially in the third world) should 
restrict the movement of labour to core countries. The pessimists argue further that in most 
cases, a significant proportion of remittances to migrant-sending regions is spent on daily 
consumption and not invested to generate more income. The pessimists assert that with time, 
the remittance recipients become overly dependent on migrants and may not even be willing to 
work.  
Since the 1980s, these extreme opposing perspectives were replaced by pluralist perspectives 
which considered agency and structure as important factors in the migration-development 
debate (de Haas 2010; Serbeh et al. 2016). For instance, having criticized the neoclassical theory 
for assuming that migration decisions are only taken by individuals, the New Economics of Labour 
Migration (NELM) theory argued that migration decisions are often taken by households to 
diversify livelihoods and insure the household against future risks. Consequently, one of the main 
goals of migrants is the transfer of remittances to household members left behind (Stark 1991). 
Supporting the role of remittances in promoting development and welfare at migrants’ origins, 
Ratha (2007) asserted that remittances are the most tangible link between migration and 
development. He argued that remittances have both direct and indirect effects on the welfare of 
the population in the migrant sending countries.  
Some other researchers have reported positive correlation between remittances on one hand 
and poverty reduction in Latin America, Africa, South Asia (Fajnzylber and Lopez 2007, Gupta et 
al. 2007, Anyanwu and Erhijakpor 2010). In an earlier study in Ghana, for instance, Quartey (2006) 
reported that international remittances helped households to minimize the effects of economic 
shocks on household welfare.  Similarly, Mohapatra et al. (2009) reported that, in Ethiopia, 
remittances-receiving households used the cash received to cope with drought and thereby 
avoided selling of livestock (Mohapatra et al. 2009). Despite these positive reports on migration 
and welfare nexus, some studies have shown that migration and remittances does not reduce 
poverty in some countries (Cuong et al. 2009). It has been shown that in some cases, recipients 
may become dependent on remittances, and fall into poverty when the migrant stops sending 
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The empirical literature on impact of migration on welfare 
A key issue that requires attention in any assessment of migration’s welfare impact is the choice 
of the welfare measure. Given that welfare (or wellbeing) may be defined as living standard or 
quality of life, the sheer broadness of the notion poses a challenge to any attempt to measure it. 
This has resulted in the adoption of various proxies for welfare, notable ones being income, 
consumption expenditure, and multidimensional measures (see Deaton 2016), with the 
occasional use of subjective wellbeing measures (see Gori-Maia 2013). While none of these 
proxies for welfare is perfect, the use of consumption expenditure has gained considerable 
appeal for some years now. This has further been boosted by the increased availability of various 
rounds of Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS) type of data for a number of developing 
countries (). Thus, the choice of consumption expenditure as a proxy for welfare is often 
considered to be a reasonable one. 
Regarding the empirical assessment of the welfare impact of migration, studies have typically 
drawn on the broader literature on impact evaluation (see for example Ravallion, 2007) These 
studies usually adopt a counterfactual framework by trying to compare the current welfare level 
with the counterfactual level of welfare, that is, what the current welfare level would have been 
in the absence of migration. In dealing with non-experimental data, like the kind available for 
estimating migration’s welfare impact, the counterfactual scenario cannot be observed. This has 
compelled scholars to employ various econometric and/or quantitative approaches to establish 
the counterfactual levels of welfare to facilitate the impact evaluation. The various quantitative 
techniques for carrying out an impact evaluation include the instrumental variable approach, 
pipeline comparison, propensity score matching (PSM), regression discontinuity, and difference-
in-differences (DID) methods.  
One of the basic approaches to the assessment of migration’s welfare impact is the use of a 
welfare regression that includes a dummy variable for migration status (see, for example, Yap 
1976). Here, the coefficient of the dummy variable would, all things being equal, be expected to 
capture migration’s effect on the welfare outcome of interest. While this method is intuitive, it 
is weakened by the concern that non-migrants (or non-migrant households) are not necessarily 
an appropriate control group for establishing counterfactual welfare levels, since the sample of 
migrant households is likely to be non-random. Estimating the impact of migration on household 
welfare is challenging. The opportunities to adopt an experimental technique are limited, as 
there are few experiments that can be credibly applied in the field of migration. Notable 
exceptions include the visa lottery analysis by Gibson et al, (2011) and the experiment by Bryan 
et al (2011) which focuses on incentives to migrate. As a result, others have attempted to 
circumvent this drawback by estimating separate welfare equations for migrants (or migrant 
households) and non-migrants, with an appropriate adjustment for selectivity bias. These 
separate selectivity-adjusted regressions then become the basis for the estimation of 
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counterfactual welfare scenarios for evaluating migration’s welfare impact (see, for example, 
Nakosteen and Zimmer 1980; and Tunali 2000). Using this approach and data from the 1999/2000 
Ghana Living Standards Survey (GLSS), Boakye-Yiadom (2008) estimated that migration had a 
favourable impact on the well-being of rural-to-urban migrants, but had a converse welfare 
impact on urban-to-rural migrants. These findings are similar to those of Ackah and Medvedev 
(2012) who also employed a similar technique, but with 2005/2006 GLSS data. 
As one would expect, the various quantitative techniques for assessing the welfare impact of 
migration have their strengths and drawbacks.  Nevertheless, some have gained considerable 
appeal. In this regard, the propensity score matching (PSM) technique and the difference-in-
difference (DID) method are notable (see Brauw et al, 2018; Cox-Edwards and Rodríguez-Oreggia, 
2009; Namayengo et al., 2016; Winters et al., 2011; Feder et al., 2011; Li and Hu, 2011; Bernard, 
2010, Gibson and Mckenzie, 2014, Yang, 2008), for empirical application). The PSM method, 
which was developed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) tries to use the observed characteristics 
of both treated and control samples (migrant and non-migrant households in our case) to match 
units from both samples that have very similar probabilities of receiving a treatment or 
intervention (migration, in our context). This matching then becomes the basis for a comparison 
of welfare outcomes between the treated (e.g. migrant households) and control (e.g. non-
migrant households). The DID method, on the other hand, is a technique that uses observations 
for treated and control units before and after the intervention. The difference-in-difference 
method, therefore, requires panel (or similar) data for its successful application. Thus, while the 
DID technique has the advantage of employing a richer set of data for the impact assessment, 
the stringent feature of the data requirements is also a disadvantage. 
 
Data and methodology 
To examine the effect of changes in migration status on household welfare, we use two rounds 
of the Migrating out of Poverty household survey data from rural Ghana. A sample of around 
1400 households were interviewed about their migration experience and data was also collected 
on a range of welfare outcomes in 2015. The sample of households were selected in a two-stage 
process. Enumeration areas in rural areas of five regions were randomly selected, and 
households were pre-screened as to their migration status in order to generate reasonable 
samples of households with and without migrants. Households were re-interviewed in 2018 with 
replacement of households which dropped out of the sample. This paper is largely based on only 
the households that were surveyed in both 2015 and 2018.    
This dataset uniquely allow us to observe households that did not have migrants over a three-
year period. Over the three-year period, between 2015 and 2018 we can observe and examine 
changes in household migration status, changes in remittances, and changes in the household’s 
objective and subjective welfare. In the 2015 wave of the data set, a total of 409 households had 
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no migrants (whether current migrants, returned migrants, internal or international migrants). 
Table 1 presents a migration transition matrix for the households without a migrant household 
member interviewed in 2015. So, we treat 2015 as the pretreatment period, while the data 
collected on the same households in 2018 is treated as post-treatment data. Of these 409 
households that had no migrant in 2015, a total of 152 households or about 37 percent had 
internal migrants by 2018. Two hundred and eighteen (218 or 53 percent) of the households in 
2015 without a migrant member still had no migrant member in 2018.  Eight representing 2 
percent had international migrants. In addition, over the three-year period, some households 
have had returned migrants. Specifically, 28 households had internal returned migrants whereas 
3 households had international returned migrants. 
Since the number of households with international migrants between the two waves of the data 
is small (8), we focus on the impact of internal migration on household welfare.  Thus, the 
treatment households (migrant households) are household that did not have a migrant 
household member in 2015 but reported having a migrant in 2018 (152 households) and control 
households (non-migrant households) are the households still without a migrant member in 
2018. Thus, the targeted sample for the analysis is 370 households. The nature of the data sets 
the tone for two clear empirical strategies: propensity score matching (PSM) estimators on the 
2018 data and DID using the panel. Under the PSM, we estimate the probability of having a 
household member being a migrant in 2018. The rationale of the PSM is to match households in 
the treatment group (migrant households) with those in the control comparison group (non-
migrant households) based on propensity scores. Based on the estimated propensity scores 
(pscores), households with similar scores but different treatment statuses are matched to 
estimate the impact of the treatment (change in household migration status) on welfare 
outcomes. The matching is done to ensure that the treatment and comparison groups are 
balanced on observable characteristics and such as such any remaining differences served can be 
attributed to the treatment (Khandker, Koolwal, and Samad, 2010; Namayengo et al, 2018). To 
reduce the level of biasedness resulting from choosing observable covariates for which the 
matching is carried out to generate the propensity scores, many variables were tried (King and 
Nielson, 2016). Thus, under the PSM approach, we estimate the probability of having a household 
member being a migrant in 2018 based on observable household characteristics.  The average 
treated effect on the treated (ℾ𝐴𝑇𝑇) is defined as: 
 
ℾ𝐴𝑇𝑇 = 𝐸(ℾ|𝐷 = 1) = 𝐸[𝑌(1)|𝐷 = 1] −  𝐸[𝑌(0)|𝐷 = 1],     (1) 
where 𝐷 = 1 if the household had a migrant member in 2018 and 𝐷 = 0 when the household 
had no migrant member in 2018. 𝑌(𝐷) is the welfare outcome of each household. The ℾ𝐴𝑇𝑇 can 
be expressed as (see Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983): 
ℾ𝐴𝑇𝑇 = 𝐸𝑃(𝑋)|𝐷=1[𝐸(𝑌(1)|𝐷 = 1), 𝑃(𝑋)] −  𝐸[𝑌(0)|𝐷 = 0], 𝑃(𝑋)]],    (2) 
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where   𝑃(𝑋) is the propensity score, which captures the probability of a household recording a 
migrant in 2018 given observed characteristic X.  
 
The results on the impact of migration on welfare from the PSM may be biased because there 
may be factors that may drive the likelihood of a member migrating that is not properly captured 
in the estimation of the pscore i.e., omitted variable bias. Any such omission could impact the 
reliability of our empirical estimates. A DID estimation approach is able to control for any 
unobserved characteristic that remains unchanged from 2015. Another advantage of the DID 
approach is that any permanent differences in outcomes between the treatment and the 
comparison group in 2015 can be netted out to find the true impact of the treatment.  According 
to Khanddker et al. (2010), the method recognizes that unobserved heterogeneity may be 
present, but assume that such factors are time-invariant and are therefore controlled for in DID 
estimation. Thus, our DID estimator measures the impact of having a migrant in 2018 by 
comparing treatment households with comparison households on changes in outcomes of 
interest over time relative to the outcomes observed at baseline in 2015. The DID estimation 
approach, therefore, allows us to take full advantage of the panel nature of our data. 
The DID estimator is specified in Equation 3.  
ℎℎ 𝑊𝑒𝑙𝑓𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖 = 𝛼 +  𝛽𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 + 𝛾𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 + 𝛿𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 ∗ 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 + 𝜑𝑖 (3) 
The variable 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 is a dummy, which takes on a value one (𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 1) for a 
household that had no migrant in 2015 but had a migrant household member in 2018, and takes 
on the value of zero (𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 = 0)for households that did not have any migrant household 
member in 2015 and also reported not having any migrant household member in 2018. The 
variable 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 is also a dummy that takes on a value of one (𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 =1) for 2018 and zero (𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 =
0) for 2015. This time variable captures the effect of time on the outcome variable if there was 
no treatment. The DID estimator which captures the effect of treatment on the outcome is given 
by the coefficient on the interaction between treatment and time (𝛿). 
 
Table 1: Household migration transition matrix 
 2015 HH 
migration 
status 
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Measurement of Poverty  
Poverty is a complex phenomenon that is difficult to define and measure in empirical research. 
Neoclassical economic models measured poverty by employment and income status (Harris and 
Todaro, 1970), but new economics of labour models, which focus on households rather than 
individuals, have provided a broader conceptualization of poverty which considers other 
indicators such as education, healthcare, and asset accumulation (Massey 1999; Awumbila, 
2016). The World Bank (2000:15) provides a broader definition of poverty as a “pronounced 
deprivation in well-being”. This definition considers achievement in education and healthcare 
and not only income. Following  this nuanced conceptualization and the definition often used by 
Ghana Statistical Service (GSS 2007:1), we define poverty  as a lack of capabilities to function 
which may include a lack of income, malnutrition, a lack of access to education, poor health, 
insecurity and poor shelter among others.  
 
Different approaches to the measurement of poverty have been used by different researchers.  
One of these is absolute poverty, which is usually measured in terms of income and is defined by 
reference to a particular quantitative measure that distinguishes the poor from the non-poor 
(Frye 2005). Absolute poverty reflects the lack of adequate resources to meet a specified 
minimum quantum of basic needs which is established based on the cost of purchasing a 
minimum basket of goods and services required for human survival (Todaro and Smith 2011:212). 
The World Bank’s definition of poverty with reference to this amount is a minimum threshold of 
US$1.25 a day.  
 
While the above expenditure measurement is useful for comparing poverty levels in different 
geographical regions (World Bank, 2000:16), it ignores other dimensions of well-being such as 
literacy, good health, and security (Cohen, 2009:24). In this study therefore, we collected data 
on consumption expenditure levels but also measured poverty based on respondents’ subjective 
assessment of the overall welfare of their households. In this paper we, used a national “poverty 
line of GH¢1,314.0 per adult equivalent per year and an extreme poverty line of GH¢792.2 per 
adult equivalent per year” and this was consistent with the poverty line reported by the Ghana 





Descriptive statistics and balance  
Table 1 summarizes and compares basic 2018 demographic information of the two groups 
(treatment and control), distinguishing between households who had migrant members in 2018 
and households without migrant members in 2018. As indicated earlier, both the control and 
treated groups did not have migrant household members. Thus, the change in the migration 
status of the households over the three-year period does allow us to examine the impact of 
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having a migrant (internal migrant) on household outcomes. Overall, we were successful at 
tracking 370 households who did not have any migrant in 2015. Out of that number, 152 (41%) 
reported having an internal migrant in 2018 whereas 218 households reported still not having an 
internal migrant in 2018 (or any migrant).  
On average, treated households (household have a migrant in 2018) are more likely to have a 
high percentage of household members who are married (39.4 percent), compared with 
controlled households (households without a migrant in 2018) (29.78 percent). This difference is 
statistically significant. On average, household members are less than 30 years old, with both 
treated and control households having an average age of 29 years. So, there are no significant 
differences in this variable between treatment and control households. Also, in terms of gender 
differences within the households, we find that about 56 percent of the members of treated 
households are males, whereas approximately 50 percent of controlled households are male. 
Thus, there seem to be slightly more males in controlled households than in the treated 
households (p-value=0.008).  
We also compare differences in education between treated and control households. There seem 
not to be significant differences in the educational level of the household head between treated 
and control households. Precisely, 9 percent of household heads in both treated and control 
households have primary education as the highest attained level of education. In terms of high 
school education, 21 percent and 20 percent of household heads in treated and control 
households, respectively, have a high school education.  The proportion of household heads with 
secondary school and tertiary education are balanced between treated and control households. 
Education of the household head is tightly linked to the gender of the household head. Education 
of the household head is tightly linked to the gender of the household head. We find that about 
37 percent of treated households are headed by females whereas 24 percent of controlled 
households are headed by females. This is not too surprising considering the fact that, in absolute 
terms the majority of migrants are males, leaving behind their wives.  
We are also interested, as an outcome variable, in differences in welfare between control and 
treated households. We find that per capita nominal consumption in treated households of 
1480GHS at baseline is slightly lower compared with consumption expenditure of 1810GHS in 
control households (p-value=0.009). Thus, households that recorded migrant members over the 
three years are more likely to be households with lower baseline consumption levels. It must be 
noted that the dependency ratio is slightly higher in control households than in treated 
households. Other variables such as household head employment and asset ownership are well-
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Table 1: Descriptive on covariates used for computing the propensity scores for treatment and 
control. 
  Treatment Control 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. 
Dev. 




Percentage  of household members 
who are married 
152 39.35 26.42 218 29.78 26.21 0.001 
average age of household members 152 28.90 8.71 218 29.27 12.80 0.757 
Square of the average age of 
household members 
152 910.41 584.80 218 1019.56 1049.25 0.246 
Percentage of household members 
who are males 
152 46.09 21.42 218 49.75 24.39 0.137 
Education of the HH head: primary 
(base is none) 
152 0.09 0.29 218 0.09 0.28 0.870 
Education of the HH head: 
JHS/middle school 
152 0.21 0.41 218 0.20 0.40 0.755 
Education of the HH head: SHS 152 0.08 0.27 218 0.08 0.27 0.973 
Education of the HH head: Tertiary 152 0.11 0.32 218 0.08 0.27 0.269 
Per capita nominal 
consumption/100  
151 14.80 9.11 214 18.10 13.54 0.009 
Household size 151 6.90 3.37 214 6.03 3.30 0.015 
Age of HH head 151 54.03 16.26 214 49.10 14.98 0.003 
Female head 151 0.37 0.48 215 0.24 0.43 0.008 
HH head is married 152 0.64 0.48 218 0.78 0.42 0.004 
HH dependency ratio  152 0.33 0.23 218 0.38 0.24 0.046 
Hh head has paid employment 152 0.13 0.34 218 0.13 0.34 0.968 
Hh owns land 152 0.51 0.50 218 0.55 0.50 0.407 
Hh has a toilet facility 152 0.43 0.50 218 0.28 0.45 0.001 
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Hh has a car 152 0.10 0.30 218 0.07 0.25 0.302 
Hh has a fridge 152 0.22 0.41 218 0.24 0.43 0.631 
Region: North (base is BA) 152 0.20 0.40 218 0.25 0.44 0.280 
Upper East 152 0.17 0.38 218 0.18 0.38 0.846 
Upper West 152 0.21 0.41 218 0.12 0.33 0.025 




Table 2 presents the poverty incidence based on the consumption expenditure on food and non-
food items at the household level. The questions on food expenditure were on a weekly basis 
whereas that on non-food was on a monthly basis. To obtain the yearly food expenditure for a 
typical household, the weekly expenditure of all food items per week were summed and then 
annualized by multiplying by 52. With regards to the nonfood expenditure, the yearly 
expenditure was obtained by summing the monthly expenditure of several items on a monthly 
basis and annualized by multiplying by 12. The total yearly household consumption expenditure 
is obtained by summing the food and nonfood expenditures. In order to obtain real values of our 
consumption expenditures, the values for each household were deflated with the 2012 consumer 
price index (CPI2012). The “poverty line of GH¢1,314.0 per adult equivalent per year and an 
extreme poverty line of GH¢792.2 per adult equivalent per year” were used, so as to be 
consistent with the poverty line reported by the Ghana Statistical Service (based on the GLSS7 
poverty report). All poverty incidences in our data across the five regions sampled in our study 
are compared with GLSS6 and 7 poverty estimates for the same selected regions.  
There is a clear indication from our sample (and that of the GLSS for these selected regions) that 
welfare appears to have deteriorated. In our case, welfare has deteriorated between the two 
waves both for treatment and control households. The poverty incidence for 2015 shows that 
28% of households that did not have a migrant household member was considered poor 
whereas, in 2018, the incidence of poverty among non-migrant households increased to 51.8%. 
For migrant households, whereas 33.3% were considered poor in 2015, that share increased to 
71.7%. Note that among all households that did not have a migrant household member in 2015, 
41% had internal migrants in 2018. Our finding shows that poverty is a critical driver in rural 
migration and sadly short-term migration does not address initial household poverty. Thus, at 
most three years of having a migrant member of the household has not been enough to improve 
household welfare. Based on our estimates in Tables 1 and 2, poverty is still relatively high among 
rural migrant households in our sample compared to the GLSS all rural estimates.  
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Migrant  Rural Rural  
Brong Ahafo 16.2 16.7 43.2 66.7 36.3 38.9 
Northern 21.8 32.3 48.2 90.3 61.1 74.3 
Upper East 38.5 26.9 64.1 96.3 50.1 64.8 
Upper West 59.3 59.4 74.1 68.8 80.3 80.5 
Volta 19.6 26.0 42.4 50.0 39.0 46.6 
Total 28.0 33.8 51.8 71.7   
 
Based on our 2018 poverty line of GH¢1,314.0 per adult equivalent per year, we estimated 
poverty incidence across the various regions. For rural households with a migrant in 2018, we 
found the poverty incidence in the Northern and Upper East regions to be over 90% in each case. 
Notably, even though from the GLSS7 data, the incidence of poverty among rural households in 
the Upper West region was 80.5%, our data show that migrant households are a little better. In 
general, a three-year migrant household status seems not to improve welfare. It is possible that 
families left behind may have to remit in-kind to support their migrant members at the onset of 
migration, thereby putting pressure on resources at the origin. This can be teased out properly 
in a qualitative study. We note also that while the GLSS7 Report on poverty trends states that 
Ghana recorded a marginal drop in poverty incidence between 2012/2013 and 2016/2017, it 
asserts that five out of ten regions (Volta Region, Brong Ahafo Region, Northern Region, Upper 
East Region, and Upper West Region) have extreme poverty incidences higher than the national 
average (GSS, 2018). The Report further adds that extreme poverty incidence worsened between 
2012/13 and 2016/17 in these regions. Incidentally, these five regions are the very regions this 
study focuses on. Moreover, given that the households sampled in our study are predominantly 
rural, and that Ghana’s poverty is largely a rural phenomenon, these observations place our 
findings in context. 
We now present data on poverty transition among households between the 2015 survey and 
that of the 2018 survey. Overall we see that households in our treatment group (with no migrants 
in 2015 but with migrants in 2018) were more likely to remain poor or to fall into poverty than 
households in our control group. A poverty transition matrix (Table 3) is presented for treatment 
and control households separately. The data show that for the non-migrant households in 2015 
who had a migrant in 2018 (migrant households), 33.8 percent were poor in 2015 whereas 66.2 
percent were non-poor that year. The Table also shows that 7.3 percent of migrant households 
had a switch of poverty status from poor to non-poor between the two survey years, whereas 
45.7 percent experienced a transition from non-poor to poor between 2015 and 2018. On the 
other hand, 26.5 percent of migrant households remained poor over the two periods, while 20.5 
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migrant households were non-poor in both periods.  Regarding the control (non-migrant) 
households, 22.4 percent remained poor in both 2015 and 2018, while 42.1 percent remained 
non-poor in both periods. On the contrary, 5.6 percent of non-migrant households had 
experienced a transition in status from poor to non-poor, while 29.9 percent of non-migrant 
households registered a switch from being non-poor to being poor between 2015 and 2018.   
Table 3: Poverty transition table for treatment and control 
  2018 
2015 
Poverty status Non-Poor Poor Total 
Treatment: had a Migrant 
Non-Poor 20.53 45.7 66.23 
Poor 7.28 26.49 33.77 
Total 27.81 72.19 100 
Control: Non-Migrant 
Non-Poor 42.06 29.91 71.96 
Poor 5.61 22.43 28.04 
Total 47.66 52.34 100 
 
As presented earlier, household consumption expenditures for food and nonfood are used to 
measure welfare in this study. Another important measure of welfare which we use in this study 
is the subjective change in the financial situation in the household as described by the head of 
the household. Respondents were asked to rate their financial situation with regards to basic 
needs at the time of the interview as compared to 2 years earlier. The response options for this 
variable were ‘improved a lot’, ‘somewhat improved’, ‘remained the same’, ‘somewhat 
deteriorated’ and ‘deteriorated a lot’.  
Our objective is to investigate the effect of a change in household migration status on subjective 
wellbeing.  Table 4 presents data on treatment and control households’ responses to the 
question of changes in subjective wellbeing. The data shows that whereas 3.3 percent of treated 
households think the financial situation with regards to basic needs has improved, only 1.4 
percent of control household hold a similar opinion.   In terms of ‘somewhat improved’ option, 
we find that 42.8 percent of treated households feel that their financial situation with regards to 
basic needs have somewhat improved while approximately 40 percent of control group 
household hold this opinion.   Thus, it appears that a higher percentage of the treatment group 
had experienced some improvement (46.1%)  as compared to the control group (41.3%) 
on average. But the Pearson chi-square statistic is not significant, meaning there is not enough 
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evidence to assert that the treatment group experienced any differences in the subjective 
financial situation than the control group1.  
Table 4: Subjective financial situation in 2018 for treatment and control (percent). 
 Subjective financial situation in 2018 Treatment Control 
Improved a lot 3.3 1.4 
Somewhat improved 42.8 39.9 
Remained the same 32.9 33.5 
Somewhat deteriorated 13.8 17.9 
Deteriorated a lot 7.2 7.3 
Total- Pearson chi2(4) =   2.6214   Pr = 0.623 100 100 
 
Table 5 presents data on households transition matrix on improvements or otherwise of 
subjective financial situation between 2015 and 2018 for both treatment (migrant) and control 
(non-migrant) households. Precisely, we explore, for example, households whom in 2015 
indicated that their financial situation had improved a lot compared to three years prior, how 
their subjective financial situation has changed in 2018. We start by reporting the transition in 
financial situation among treated (migrant) households. Using the data presented in Table 5, we 
find that out of the 2 percent of households that indicated that their financial situation had 
improved a lot in 2015, 0.7 percent suggest ‘somewhat’ deterioration of their financial situation 
in 2018 whereas 1.3 percent have had ‘somewhat’ improvement. None of these households 
reported household welfare improving a lot over the 2015 level. So, we see some deterioration 
of household welfare among households that originally reported significant improvement in 
welfare in 2015. Other significant differences in subjective welfare transition are observed 25.6 
percent of households that reported ‘somewhat improved’ financial situation in 2015. Among 
this group, notably, 2.7 percent and 1.3 percent reported experiencing significant deterioration 
in financial situation – ‘Somewhat deteriorated’ and ‘Deteriorated a lot’, respectively – in 2018. 
Approximately, 8.6 percent of households that reported ‘somewhat’ improvement in financial 
situation in 2015, thought that their situation has remained the same whereas 11.9 percent 
reported that their financial situation has ‘somewhat improved’. Notably, 2 percent of migrant 
household who thought their financial situation had improved reported that their financial 
situation had ‘improved a lot’. 
Interestingly, out of 34.4 percent of households that reported in 2015 that their financial 
situation had remained the same, 15.9 percent reported ‘somewhat’ improvement in financial 
situation in 2018 while 5.3 percent reported a deterioration of financial situation. For about 13.3 
percent of households in this category, their financial situation has not changed since 2015.  For 
households that thought that their financial situation in 2015 had ‘somewhat deteriorated’ 
(23.8%), 8.6 percent think that their situation in 2018 had deteriorated beyond that of 2015. 
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However, the situation is not all that gloomy for this group. About 9.3 percent of households that 
reported ‘somewhat deterioration’ in financial situation in 2015, in 2018, reported improvement 
financial situation. Lastly, for the13.3 percent of migrant households that reported in 2015 that 
financial situation has worsened prior to the change in migration status, 6 percent reported 
improvement in financial situation in 2018.  
 We now turn our attention to transition in the subjective financial situation among non-migrant 
controlled households. For all non-migrant controlled households that reported that their 
financial situation has improved a lot in 2015, none reported a similar improvement in financial 
situation. Hundred percent (100%) of non-migrant households that reported that their financial 
situation has improved a lot in 2015 reported somewhat improvement in financial situation in 
2018. Notable transition among the non-migrant households is recorded for the 12.1 percent of 
households that in 2015 reported that their financial situation had worsened. For this group, 5.6 
percent reported worsened financial situation beyond their 2015 deteriorated level. This 
compares with 2.7 percent of treated migrant households in the same category. Overall, 
examining transition in household subjective welfare, we find significant gains for migrant 
treated households that originally in 2015 had deteriorated financial situation at baseline.  
Majority of the non-migrant controlled household that had deteriorated financial situation in 
2015 did not see significant improvement in financial situation. We acknowledge that these are 
made on the basis of our descriptive statistics. In the empirics that follow, we test whether these 
observed differences in subjective welfare between treated migrant households and control non-
migrant households are statistically significant.  
 
Table 5: Household transition matrix on subjective financial situation for treatment and control 
 
2018 












Improved a lot 0.0 1.3 0.0 0.7 0.0 2.0 
Somewhat improved 2.0 11.9 8.6 2.7 1.3 26.5 
Remained the same 0.0 15.9 13.3 4.0 1.3 34.4 
Somewhat 
Deteriorated 
0.7 8.6 6.0 4.6 4.0 23.8 
Deteriorated a lot 0.7 5.3 4.6 2.0 0.7 13.3 
Total 3.3 43.1 32.5 13.9 7.3 100.0 
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Control 
Improved a lot 0.0 1.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.9 
Somewhat improved 0.5 18.6 7.0 3.3 0.9 30.2 
Remained the same 0.9 13.0 9.8 6.1 1.4 31.2 
Somewhat 
deteriorated 
0.0 5.1 11.2 6.1 2.3 24.7 
Deteriorated a lot 0.0 1.4 5.1 2.8 2.8 12.1 
Total 1.4 40.0 33.0 18.1 7.4 100.0 
 
Matching Estimation  
First, we ask whether having a migrant household member for at most three-years improves 
household welfare in rural areas. This analysis is carried out on all household without any migrant 
household member in 2015. In 2018, some of these households reported having a migrant 
household member. Using the 2018 data, and applying the PSM estimation approach, we 
estimate the impact of having a migrant household member on household welfare. Two broad 
welfare indicators are examined in this study: consumption expenditure (both food and nonfood) 
and subjective wellbeing. Table 6 presents the marginal effects of the variable used to generate 
the propensity scores (p-scores) as explained under the methodology. The list of observable 
variables in Table 6 gives the best fit as per the trials. The coefficients are the marginal effects of 
the variables in predicting the probability of a household having a migrant in 2018.  
 
From Table 6, we find that the key drivers of household migration status in 2018 includes, 
proportion of household members who are males, education of the household head, marital 
status of the household head, age of household head, household assets  ownership (land 
ownership, toilet in the house, and having a car),  and regional differences. Specifically, Table 6 
suggests that households with more male members are less likely to have a migrant household 
member in the three-year period of this study. This result is economically meaningful in the sense 
that households with more male members are 2 percent less likely to have a migrant household 
member, and consistent with descriptive findings which shows that males are more likely to be 
the first to migrate than females. The positive coefficient estimate on the tertiary education of 
household heads suggests that household heads with tertiary education are about 20 percent 
more likely to have a migrant household member with the three-year period than households 
with headed by primary education school leavers. This result buttresses the importance of 
education as an important driver of household migration decisions. With regards to other key 
drivers, we find that households with married household heads are about 17% less likely to have 
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a migrant household member with the three-year period of the study, whereas the age of 
household heads is positively related to the migration of household members.   Thus, for the 
latter, households with older heads are more likely to have one of their members migrating to 
support the families left behind.  
Table 6: Marginal effects of the probit results for computing the propensity scores.  
VARIABLES Marginal effect 
proportion of household members who are married 0.0012 
  (0.0010) 
average age of household members 0.0209 
  (0.0141) 
Square of the average age of household members -0.0004** 
  (0.0002) 
proportion of household members who are males -0.0021* 
  (0.0011) 
Education of the HH head: primary (base is none) 0.0810 
  (0.0799) 
JHS/middle school 0.0669 
  (0.0696) 
SHS 0.0439 
  (0.1005) 
Tertiary 0.2044** 
  (0.1002) 
Per capita nominal consumption /100 -0.0039 
  (0.0028) 
Hhsize 0.0105 
  (0.0097) 
Age of HH head 0.0058*** 
  (0.0022) 
Female head 0.0054 
  (0.0620) 
HH head is married -0.1692*** 
  (0.0632) 
HH dependency ratio  -0.1545 
  (0.1481) 
Hh head has paid employment -0.0815 
  (0.0780) 
Hh owns land -0.0803* 
  (0.0472) 
Hh has a toilet 0.2054*** 
  (0.0546) 
Hh has a car 0.1432* 
  (0.0862) 
Hh has a fridge -0.0953 
  (0.0638) 
Region: North (base is BA) 0.2097** 
  (0.0881) 
Upper East 0.2769*** 
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  (0.0866) 
Upper West 0.2926*** 
  (0.0871) 
Volta 0.2975*** 
  (0.0760) 
Pseudo R2 0.1785 
Observations 365 
Standard errors in parentheses:*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1   
 
The role of assets in migration decisions of households have been discussed at length in the 
literature (Awumbila et al., 2014; Teye et al., 2019). Interestingly, we find that different assets 
have different impacts on migration decisions within rural households. Firstly, we find that since 
many rural dwellers are involved in agriculture, land ownership is an important consideration for 
migration decisions within a rural household. Rural households with land are about 8% less likely 
to have a member migrate compared to households that do not own land. Secondly, having a 
toilet in the household positively impacts migration decision. We do not have clear reasons why 
this should be the case. In some rural communities with few toilet facilities, households with 
toilets tend to charge a small fee when others want to use their toilets. So, having a toilet could 
increase liquidity in the household or could just be picking up the general effect of household 
wealth on migration. Thirdly, household ownership of a car positively impacts the decision of 
household members to migrate. Households that own cars are about 14% more likely to have 
had a member migrate within the past three years.  
 
The matching method used in this study is Nearest-neighbor matching. The treatment 
households were matched to three control households with the closest propensity score value 
and with replacement. The condition of common support was specified, and 14 treatment 
households were discarded by the estimation for lack of common support.2 Four welfare 
variables at the household level are used as outcome measures. These are per capita food 
consumption in 2018, per capita non-food consumption in 2018, per capita food and non-food 
consumption in 2018, adult equivalent food and non-food in 2018 and a dummy for current 
financial situation improving a lot/somewhat improved or otherwise. Before discussing the main 
results, it is worth mentioning that the results of a test of biasedness of the covariates presented 
in Table 7 showing a mean bias of 5.2, is very acceptable in the literature. Appendix (Table Z) 
presents the balance test after matching between the treated migrant and control non-migrant 
households for all individual covariates. We see improvement in the balance of many of the 
covariates after matching is performed.  The B and R are summary measures proposed by Rubin 
                                                      
2The Stata command used for the matching is psmatch2.  E. Leuven and B. Sianesi. (2003). "PSMATCH2: Stata 
module to perform full Mahalanobis and propensity score matching, common support graphing, and covariate 
imbalance testing".  http://ideas.repec.org/c/boc/bocode/s432001.html. version 4.0.12 30jan2016.  
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(2001). The expectation is that B, should be below 25 for a balanced control group (Hagen, 2016). 
In our case the value of 30.2 is not very far from 25. Rubin’s R is expected to be between 0.5 and 
2. Therefore the value of 0.86 is within this range and acceptable and the balancing of pre-
treatment (migration) differences is acceptable between the two groups in the matching 
estimations. 
 
Table 7: Testing the biasedness of covariates in the matching estimation.  
Sample Ps R2 LR chi2 p>chi2 Mean Bias Med Bias B R %Var 
  
Unmatched 0.178 88.35 0 15.9 12.5 103.7* 0.81 38 
Matched 0.016 6.24 1.0 5.2 4.4 30.2* 0.86 0 
 
Table 8 presents the ATT effect of having a migrant in the past three years on household welfare. 
Based on the consumption measures, estimates from the unmatched samples show that per 
capita food consumption by the treatment households is lower (GH¢779.28) than that of the 
control households (GH¢958.48). From this estimate, one is tempted to argue that short-term or 
short-period migration does have negative consequences for households left behind. However, 
after matching the households on observables, it appears that there is no statistically significant 
evidence to conclude that migration of a household member made the families left behind worse 
off. Similar results are found nonfood consumption and for total consumption (both food and 
nonfood consumption). The results are also consistent whether consumption is measured on per 
capita or adult equivalent basis.  
With regards to the subjective wellbeing outcome, we find that even though for the unmatched 
sample showed an insignificant improvement in subjective wellbeing for treated households, the 
matched sample ATT effect shows insignificant differences in improvement in wellbeing between 
the treated migrant households and control non-migrant households. So, in general, our overall 
results show that short-term migration (within three years) does not improve the welfare of 
families left behind significantly compared to the welfare of non-migrant households. 
 
Table 8: Impacts of sending an internal migrant on welfare in rural Ghana using PSM 
Variable Sample Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-stat 
  
Per capita food in 2018 
Unmatched 779.28 958.48 -179.21 85.04 -2.11 
ATT 770.53 802.02 -31.49 95.53 -0.33 
  
Per capita non-food in 2018 
Unmatched 589.14 685.56 -96.42 106.75 -0.9 
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Per capita food and non-food 
in 2018 
Unmatched 1368.42 1644.05 -275.63 174.64 -1.58 
ATT 1360.18 1369.94 -9.76 187.15 -0.05 
  
Adult equivalent food and 
non-food in 2018 
Unmatched 1701.39 2091.90 -390.50 206.57 -1.89 
ATT 1687.66 1720.48 -32.83 227.09 -0.14 
  
Financial situation improved a 
lot or somewhat improved=1, 
otherwise zero 
Unmatched 0.46 0.42 0.04 0.05 0.78 
ATT 0.46 0.46 0.00 0.08 -0.06 
 
 
Difference-in-difference (DID) estimator 
Now we exploit the panel nature of our data to estimate the impact of having a migrant member 
on welfare using difference-in-difference (DID) approach. As indicated earlier under the 
methodology, the DID estimation approach improves the estimates obtained under the PSM 
estimator and also allow us to take full advantage of the panel nature of our data. Table 9 
presents the DID impact of migration on welfare. Columns 1 to 3 present the DID estimated 
results for household consumption as an outcome variable whereas column 4 presents the 
results for the subjective welfare indicator. Precisely, Column 1 presents the DID estimated 
results for food consumption whereas column 2 presents the results for nonfood consumption. 
The DID impact of treatment on total consumption is presented in column 3.    
The DID results, as presented in Table 9, shows that the treatment variable is negative and 
significant in columns 1 – 3, signifying significant differences in real per capita consumption (food, 
nonfood, and total consumption) between treatment and comparison group at time zero 
(𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 = 0) or in the year 2015. For example, in column 1 of Table 9 households that ended up 
having a migrant member in 2018 (migrant households), in 2015 had real per capita food 
consumption of about 283.26GHS lower than households that did not experience any migration 
of members in 2018 (non-migrant households. In terms of non-food consumption (column 2), the 
difference in real per capita non-food consumption level between migrant households and non-
migrant households in 2015 was 158.04GHS. Precisely, non-migrant households had a higher 
non-food consumption of about 158.04GHS than migrant households. Overall, as shown by 
Column 3, consumption levels at baseline in 2015 on average was about 475.92GHS higher in 
non-migrant households compared with that of migrant households. This overall difference is 
about 100USD.3  These differences are consistent with the estimated differences in baseline 
consumption between migrant and non-migrants which was explained under the descriptive 
results. As explained earlier, this significant initial differences in consumption outcomes in 2015 
are accounted for, in estimating the causal impact of migration. The coefficient on the interaction 
between the treatment dummy and the time dummy, which represents the DID estimate is found 
                                                      
3 The exchange rate as at December 31, 2018 was 4.8176GHS to the US Dollar.  
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to be positive indicating that having a migrant positively impacts household consumption. 
However, this coefficient is not significant.  
The DID impact result shows that there could be potential benefits of migration, but three years 
may be too short a period to observe the impact of migration. It is also a reflection of the time it 
takes for migrants to adjust in their destination to be able to substantially support their 
households left behind. We find similar results for the subjective welfare outcome. The DID 
estimates show that there are no significant differences in the subjective perception of the 
financial situation of households with regards to basic needs between migrant and non-migrant 
households, even though the descriptive analysis shows a much higher improved financial 
situation for migrant households. Overall, comparing all households that did not have any 
migrant household members in 2015 overtime, and examining how changes in household 
migration three years after 2015 have impacted welfare, we conclude that internal migration 
does have instantaneous impact on helping disadvantages households to catch-up to advantaged 
high-consumption households.  
 
Table 9: Impacts of sending an internal migrant on welfare in rural Ghana- using difference-in-
difference4  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
real per capita 
food 
consumption 
real per capita 
non-food 
consumption 






Treatment -283.2645*** -158.0407* -475.9208*** -0.0336 
  (95.1581) (85.9176) (167.5718) (0.0484) 
Time -431.1311*** -331.1189*** -931.4429*** 0.0963** 
  (96.8694) (90.0916) (175.6615) (0.0460) 
Treatment*Time 99.4178 65.5651 199.5985 0.0813 
  (124.3436) (137.3873) (237.6075) (0.0714) 
Constant 1,394.7952*** 1,017.2328*** 2,581.2208*** 0.3165*** 
  (76.0144) (62.0720) (130.9258) (0.0316) 
Observations 735 734 735 740 
R-squared 0.0623 0.0310 0.0732 0.0199 
Robust standard errors in parentheses:*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
                                                      
4 As a diagnostic check, Table A3 in the Appendix shows the results for the case where there is matching at the 
base. It can be seen that qualitatively, there the two sets of results are fairly similar.  
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Conclusion 
Using a unique data set that allows us to follow households that originally did not have any 
migrant for three years, we examine how changes in household migration status have impacted 
household welfare. Baseline data on all households that did not have any migrant was collected 
in 2015 with the follow-up data collected in 2018. Using this rare data, we explored how 
migration by a member household have impacted household’s consumption and subjective 
financial situation. We also find some important descriptive results that ought to be described. 
First, we find a high incidence of internal migration in rural Ghana. About 37% of the original 
households that did not have a migrant household member in 2015 had an internal migrant 
member in 2018 whereas 2% o recorded an international migrant in 2018. This result supports 
the findings by Teye et al. (2019) which shows that, despite the migration narrative that points 
to a mass exodus of Africans to Europe, in fact, a high percentage of migration is internal 
migration. From our data, roughly 53% of the original households without any migrant in 2015 
remained non-migrant households in 2018. Due to the small incidence of international migration 
in our data, we examine the causal impact of internal migration welfare of households’ left 
behind.  
As a first step, we compared baseline households’ per capita consumption, adult equivalent 
consumption, and subjective financial situation at baseline between households that ended up 
having a migrant household member in 2018 and those that had no migrant household in both 
2015 and 2018. We find that poverty seems to be an important driver of migration in rural Ghana. 
Households with lower baseline food and nonfood consumption seem to be more likely to have 
a member migrating over the three-year period of the study than households with higher 
baseline food and nonfood consumption. To be more precise, migrant households had a lower 
level of consumption at baseline compared to non-migrant households. In examining transition 
(improvement or otherwise) in household subjective financial situation, we find significant gains 
for migrant households that originally in 2015 had deteriorated financial situation at baseline. 
Specifically, for migrant households that reported in 2015 that their financial situation had 
worsened prior to the change in migration status, 45 percent reported improvement (improved 
a lot and somewhat improvement) in financial situation in 2018. On the contrary, the majority of 
the non-migrant household that had deteriorated financial situation in 2015 did not see 
significant improvement in financial situation. About 46.2 percent of non-migrant households 
that reported deteriorated financial situation in 2015 reported that their situation had worsened 
in 2018. Thus, in terms of financial situation migrant households that had ‘deteriorated financial 
situations’ seem to be the biggest gainers of migration.    
Lastly, using both propensity score matching (PSM) and difference-in-differences (DID) 
estimation approaches to explore the causal impact of migration on welfare, we find no 
significant differences between treated and control households once initial baseline differences 
in consumption are accounted for. The results show that migration does not have instantaneous 
effects on the welfare of families left behind.  
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Table A1: Descriptives on covariates used for computing the propensity scores 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Treatment: HH sent a migrant between 2015 
and 2018 370 0.411 0.493 0 1 
Percentage  of household members who are 
married 370 33.710 26.681 0 100 
average age of household members 370 29.115 11.286 12 86 
Percentage of household members who are 
males 370 48.242 23.253 0 100 
Education of the HH head: primary (base is 
none) 370 0.089 0.285 0 1 
Education of the HH head: JHS/middle school 370 0.203 0.403 0 1 
Education of the HH head: SHS 370 0.078 0.269 0 1 
Education of the HH head: Tertiary 370 0.092 0.289 0 1 




5 124.8 10976 
Hhsize 365 6.392 3.353 1 15 
Age of HH head 365 51.140 15.689 16 102 
Female head 366 0.295 0.457 0 1 
HH head is married 370 0.724 0.447 0 1 
HH dependency ratio  370 0.360 0.236 0 1 
Hh head has paid employment 370 0.132 0.339 0 1 
Hh owns land 370 0.532 0.500 0 1 
Hh has a toilet 370 0.341 0.475 0 1 
Hh has a car 370 0.081 0.273 0 1 
Hh has a fridge 370 0.230 0.421 0 1 
Region: North (base is BA) 370 0.232 0.423 0 1 
Upper East 370 0.176 0.381 0 1 
Upper West 370 0.159 0.367 0 1 
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Table A2: Descriptives on covariates used for computing the propensity scores after 
matching. 
  Treatment Control  
P-value;  Variable Obs Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Obs Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Percentage  of household members 
who are married 
137 37.96 25.62 214 29.52 25.90 0.003 
average age of household members 137 28.70 8.94 214 29.23 12.84 0.668 
Square of the average age of 
household members 
137 902.78 602.80 214 1018.74 1055.70 0.243 
Percentage of household members 
who are males 
137 46.76 21.20 214 49.51 24.37 0.280 
Education of the HH head: primary 
(base is none) 
137 0.08 0.27 214 0.08 0.28 0.899 
Education of the HH head: 
JHS/middle school 
137 0.21 0.41 214 0.20 0.40 0.809 
Education of the HH head: SHS 137 0.09 0.28 214 0.08 0.27 0.787 
Education of the HH head: Tertiary 137 0.10 0.30 214 0.07 0.26 0.371 
Per capita nominal 
consumption/100  
137 14.54 9.05 214 18.10 13.54 0.007 
Hhsize 137 6.88 3.34 214 6.03 3.30 0.020 
Age of HH head 137 52.49 15.64 214 49.10 14.98 0.043 
Female head 137 0.34 0.47 214 0.24 0.43 0.059 
HH head is married 137 0.68 0.47 214 0.79 0.41 0.026 
HH dependency ratio  137 0.33 0.23 214 0.38 0.24 0.088 
Hh head has paid employment 137 0.15 0.35 214 0.14 0.34 0.783 
Hh owns land 137 0.50 0.50 214 0.56 0.50 0.297 
Hh has a toilet 137 0.39 0.49 214 0.28 0.45 0.029 
Hh has a car 137 0.09 0.28 214 0.07 0.25 0.441 
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Hh has a fridge 137 0.21 0.41 214 0.24 0.43 0.563 
Region: North (base is BA) 137 0.22 0.42 214 0.26 0.44 0.419 
Upper East 137 0.18 0.39 214 0.18 0.39 0.996 
Upper West 137 0.22 0.42 214 0.13 0.33 0.021 
Volta 137 0.29 0.46 214 0.26 0.44 0.536 
 
 
Table A3: Impacts of sending an internal migrant on welfare in rural Ghana- using difference-in-
difference, with matching at baseline 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
real per capita 
food consumption 
real per capita 
non-food 
consumption 






Treatment -135.5211* -32.5797 -187.2951 -0.0255 
  (80.2401) (79.2854) (145.5556) (0.0510) 
Time -365.5997*** -284.8685*** -801.8307*** 0.1044** 
  (72.6916) (65.7557) (126.6856) (0.0503) 
Treatment*Time 64.2509 35.5130 118.9582 0.0737 
  (106.3441) (125.7988) (206.2312) (0.0752) 
Constant 1,224.1069*** 884.5871*** 2,260.0565*** 0.3132*** 
  (58.5562) (50.6450) (102.3419) (0.0345) 
Observations 656 655 656 656 
R-squared 0.0637 0.0301 0.0804 0.0218 
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